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Abstract
The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as rank(A + B). Computing a Nash equilib-
rium (NE) of a rank-0, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann’28,
Dantzig’51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for constant rank games, and asked if
there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute an exact NE. Adsul et al. (2011) answered this
question affirmatively for rank-1 games, leaving rank-2 and beyond unresolved.
In this paper we show that NE computation in games with rank ≥ 3, is PPAD-hard, settling a
decade long open problem. Interestingly, this is the first instance that a problem with an FPTAS
turns out to be PPAD-hard. Our reduction bypasses graphical games and game gadgets, and provides
a simpler proof of PPAD-hardness for NE computation in bimatrix games. In addition, we get:
• An equivalence between 2D-Linear-FIXP and PPAD, improving a result by Etessami and Yan-
nakakis (2007) on equivalence between Linear-FIXP and PPAD.
• NE computation in a bimatrix game with convex set of Nash equilibria is as hard as solving a
simple stochastic game [16].
• Computing a symmetric NE of a symmetric bimatrix game with rank ≥ 6 is PPAD-hard.
• Computing a 1
poly(n) -approximate fixed-point of a (Linear-FIXP) piecewise-linear function is
PPAD-hard.
The status of rank-2 games remains unresolved.
∗Supported by NSF Grant CCF-1216019.
1 Introduction
Two player, finite, non-cooperative games constitute the most simple and fundamental model within
game theory [33], and have been studied extensively for their computational and structural properties.
Such a game can be represented by two payoff matrices (A,B), one for each player, and therefore are
also known as bimatrix games. Von Neumann (1928) showed that in games where one player’s loss is
the other player’s gain (B = −A, zero-sum), the min-max strategies are stable [41]. This turned out to
be equivalent to linear programming (LP) [19, 3] and therefore polynomial-time computable. In 1950,
John Nash [34] extended this notion to formulate an equilibrium concept, and proved its existence for
finite multi-player games. It has since been named Nash equilibrium (NE) and is perhaps the most
important and well-studied solution concept in game theory.
The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm (1964) [29], to compute Nash equilibrium in general bimatrix
games, performs very well in practice. However it may take exponential time in the worst case [37].
Other methods that followed [28, 40] are also similar in nature [8, 26], and a complexity theoretic study
of the problem was called for. Henceforth, by 2-Nash we mean computing a Nash equilibrium of a
bimatrix game.
The complexity class NP is not applicable for 2-Nash, because an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist
[34]. However, computing a special kind of NE, for numerous special properties, has been shown to be
NP-complete [25, 18]. In 1994 Papadimitriou introduced complexity class PPAD [35], Polynomial Parity
Argument for Directed graph, for problems with path following argument for existence, like Sperner’s
lemma [38]. He showed that 2-Nash, among many other problems, is in PPAD. After more than a
decade, the problem was shown to be PPAD-hard in a remarkable series of works [20, 15]. Chen et. al.
[15] showed that even 1
poly(n) -approximation of 2-Nash is PPAD-hard, i.e., if there is a fully polynomial-
time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for 2-Nash then PPAD=P. This was followed by PPAD-hardness
results for special classes of bimatrix games, like sparse games [14] and win-lose games [1], and their
approximation were also shown to be PPAD-hard.
On the positive side, polynomial-time algorithms were developed for many special classes of games;
see Section 1.2 for an overview of previous results. Among these, one of the most significant is the
class of constant rank games defined by Kannan and Theobald (2005) - rank of game (A,B) is defined
as rank(A + B). They gave an FPTAS for constant rank games,1 and asked if there is an efficient
algorithm to compute an exact NE in these games. Note that, rank-0 are zero-sum games, and therefore
are polynomial-time solvable. For rank-1 games, Adsul et. al. [5] gave a polynomial time algorithm, by
reducing the problem to 1-dimensional fixed-point, however rank-2 and beyond remained unresolved.
In this paper we show that NE computation in games with rank ≥ 3 is PPAD-hard, settling a decade
long open problem. Since there is an FPTAS for constant rank games, this result comes as a surprise,
because until now whenever a problem, in games or markets, was shown to be PPAD-hard, so was its
approximation (i.e., no FPTAS unless PPAD=P) [15, 14, 1, 12, 27].
To obtain the result, we reduce 2D-Brouwer, a two dimensional discrete fixed point problem which
is known to be PPAD-hard [11], to a rank-3 game. The reduction is done in two steps. First we reduce
2D-Brouwer to 2D-Linear-FIXP; Linear-FIXP [23] is a class of fixed-point problems with polynomial
piecewise-linear functions, and kD-Linear-FIXP is its subclass consisting of k-dimensional fixed-point
problems. In the second step, we reduce an instance of 2D-Linear-FIXP to a rank-3 bimatrix game,
such that a linear function of Nash equilibrium strategies of the resulting game gives fixed-points of the
2D-Linear-FIXP instance.
Our reduction completely bypasses the machinery of graphical games and game gadgets, central to
the previous approaches, and instead exploits relations between LPs, linear complementarity problems
(LCPs) and bimatrix games. Such a conceptual leap seems to be necessary to show hardness of constant
1O(L/ǫ)kpoly(n) time algorithm to compute an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in a rank-k n× n game of bit size L.
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rank games, since the game gadgets used previously inherently give rise to higher rank games. Our
approach also provides a simpler proof for PPAD-hardness of 2-Nash, and may be of independent
interest to show hardness for other problems, and to understand connections between parameterized
LPs and bimatrix games. We can achieve further simplification by avoiding even the parameterized LP,
but the resulting game turns out to be of high rank.
Apart from the hardness of constant rank games, a number of results follow as corollaries from
our reduction. The first step shows PPAD-hardness of 2D-Linear-FIXP and thereby improves the
equivalence result Linear-FIXP = PPAD of Etessami and Yannakakis to 2D-Linear-FIXP = PPAD.
This also implies 2D-Linear-FIXP = Linear-FIXP; in other words the class of Linear-FIXP remains
unchanged even when functions are restricted to two dimensions. Since, an instance of 1D-Linear-FIXP
can be solved in polynomial time using binary search, our result establishes a dichotomy between 1D
and kD, k ≥ 2 Linear-FIXP problems; the former are in P and the latter are PPAD-complete.
Our approach can be extended to reduce kD-Brouwer to kD-Linear-FIXP to rank-(k + 1) games,
where the reduction from kD-Linear-FIXP to rank-(k + 1) games (almost) preserves the number of
solutions. Using this, together with a result from [23], we show that bimatrix games with convex set of
NE are no easier. In fact they are as hard as solving simple stochastic games, which are known to be in
NP ∩ coNP [16], however despite significant efforts its exact complexity remains open [17, 7]. Further,
we can show that computing weak2 1
poly(n) -approximate fixed-point of a function in Linear-FIXP is also
PPAD-hard. It will be interesting to see if this can be extended to show hardness of approximation in
2-Nash.
Since NE computation in a rank-k game can be reduced to computing symmetric NE of a symmetric
game with rank-2k [36], we get that computing symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games with
rank ≥ 6 is PPAD-hard. Again computing symmetric NE in symmetric rank-0 games can be solved
using LP, and for rank-1 games recently Mehta et. al. [32] gave a polynomial-time algorithm. This
leaves the status of symmetric games with rank between 2 and 5 unresolved. Also the status of rank-2
bimatrix games remains unresolved.
1.1 Overview of the Reduction
In this section we explain the main ideas behind the reductions: from 2D-Brouwer to 2D-Linear-FIXP,
and then to rank-3 game. We start with a brief description of 2D-Brouwer and Linear-FIXP problems.
2D-Brouwer is a class of 2-dimensional discrete fixed-point problems, known to be PPAD-hard [13].
An instance of 2D-Brouwer consists of a grid Gn = {0, . . . , 2
n−1}×{0, . . . , 2n−1} and a valid coloring
function g : Gn → {0, 1, 2} which satisfies some boundary conditions, and thereby ensures existence of a
trichromatic unit square in the grid.3 The problem is to find one such trichromatic square (see Section
2.2 for details). Function g is specified by a Boolean circuit Cb with 2n input bits; n bits to represent
each of the two co-ordinate of a grid point.4
Linear-FIXP [23] is a class of fixed-point problems with polynomial piecewise-linear functions. A
function F : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n in Linear-FIXP is defined by a circuit, say C, with n real inputs and
outputs, and {max,+, ∗ζ} operations, where ∗ζ is multiplication by a rational constant (see Section
2.3 for details). Such a function has rational fixed-points of size polynomial in the input size [23]. We
denote the class of k-dimensional fixed-point problems in Linear-FIXP by kD-Linear-FIXP.
Given circuit Cb of a 2D-Brouwer instance, in Section 3 we construct a 2D-Linear-FIXP circuit C
such that all the fixed-points of the function F defined by C are in trichromatic unit squares of the grid
Gn. It is easy to simulate C
b in C by replacing ∧, ∨ and ¬ with min,max and (1−x) respectively, if input
to this simulation is guaranteed to be Boolean. To guarantee this, we need to extract bit representation
2Vector x is a weak ǫ-approximate fixed-point of function f if ‖x− f(x)‖∞ ≤ ǫ
3This is similar to the Sperner’s lemma
4We use super-script b to differentiate Boolean circuits from Linear-FIXP circuits that will follow.
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of ⌊p⌋, for a p ∈ [0, 2n − 1]2. Since, floor is a discontinuous function it can not be simulated using
Linear-FIXP circuit, whose operations can generate only continuous functions. However, we design a
bit extraction gadget which does the job for almost all the points, except those that are close to the
boundary of unit squares of Gn. Finally, using a sampling lemma similar to that of [15] we ensure that
the fixed-points of the function defined by the resulting circuit C are always in trichromatic unit squares
of the grid Gn, and we get,
Theorem 1 (Informal) Computing a fixed-point of a Linear-FIXP instance with k inputs and k out-
puts, with k > 1, is PPAD-hard. In other words, 2D-Linear-FIXP=PPAD.
Etessami and Yannakakis [23] showed that Linear-FIXP = PPAD. Theorem 2 improves this to 2D-
Linear-FIXP = PPAD, and in turn we get Linear-FIXP = 2D-Linear-FIXP, i.e., fixed-point problems
with polynomial piecewise-linear functions in constant (two) dimension are as hard as those in n-
dimension.
Next, we reduce the fixed-point computation of a kD-Linear-FIXP instance to Nash equilibrium
computation in a rank-(k+1) game (see Section 4). Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λk) denote the k inputs of circuit
C of the given kD-Linear-FIXP instance. First we replace circuit C by a parameterized linear program
LP (λ), so that circuit evaluation for a given input is same as solving the LP.
This is done as follows: There is an ordering among max gates since C forms a DAG. Suppose xi
captures the output of the ith max gate. Since the + and ∗ζ operations of circuit C generates only linear
expressions, for xj = max{L,R}, L and R both are linear expression in x1, . . . , xj−1 and λ. Further,
this max operation is equivalent to xj ≥ L, xj ≥ R, (xj−L)(xj−R) = 0. The first two linear conditions
define the feasible region of LP, where xjs are variables and λis are parameters. Note that, r.h.s. of the
constraints of LP is parameterized by (λ1, . . . , λk), and the constraint matrix is lower triangular. Using
this property we show that ∃c such that for all λ, min : cTx over this feasible region will ensure the
quadratic constraints as well for each max gate. This gives the LP (λ) which can replace circuit C.
Since, primal-dual feasibility, and complementary slackness characterizes solutions of an LP, LP is a
special case of linear complementarity problem (LCP). Using this connection for LP (λ), we construct
an LCPC whose solutions exactly capture the fixed point of the given kD-Linear-FIXP instance (Section
4.2). Further, the matrix of the LCP turns out to be off-block-diagonal, with the two blocks in off-
diagonal adding up to a rank-k matrix. Finally, using the fact that the LCP capturing Nash equilibria
of a bimatrix game also has a off-block-diagonal matrix, we construct a bimatrix game, whose Nash
equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence with the solutions of LCPC . The rank of the resulting game
turns out to be (k + 1), and one of its payoff matrix is upper-triangular.
Theorem 2 (Informal) Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with rank ≥ 3 is PPAD-
hard, even when one of the payoff matrix is lower/upper triangular.
Theorem 2, together with the reduction from 2-Nash to symmetric2-Nash [36], implies that com-
puting symmetric NE of a symmetric game with rank ≥ 6 is PPAD-hard. Further, this gives a simpler
proof of PPAD-hardness of 2-Nash, i.e., without using the graphical games and game gadgets.
In Section 4.3 we further simplify this proof by avoiding the parameterized LPs as well, where we
first construct a symmetric game whose symmetric NE are in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed-
points. As consequences we get that Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with convex
set of Nash equilibria (Corollary 33), and computing a unique symmetric NE of a symmetric game
(Corollary 38), both are as hard as solving a simple stochastic game, since the latter reduces to finding
a unique fixed-point of a Linear-FIXP problem [23].
In Section 5 we extend the first step of the reduction, to reduce kD-Brouwer to kD-Linear-FIXP.
We show that when an instance of kD-Brouwer with a k-dimensional grid {0, . . . , 2n− 1}k is reduced to
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an instance of kD-Linear-FIXP, not only exact fixed-points but also all the 12npoly(k) -approximate fixed-
points are in panchromatic unit cube of the grid. Chen et al. [15] showed that a class of kD-Brouwer
with n = 3 is PPAD-hard, where k is an input parameter and not a constant. Therefore, we get that
1
poly(L) -approximation of Linear-FIXP is PPAD-hard (Theorem 44), where L is the size of the input
instance.
It will be interesting to extend this result to bimatrix games using the reduction of Section 4.3, and
thereby getting a simpler proof of inapproximability in 2-Nash as well. Importantly, our work leaves
the status of rank-2 games, and symmetric games with rank between 2 and 5, unresolved.
1.2 Related Work
Efficient algorithms have been designed for many special classes of bimatrix games. Lipton et. al. [30]
gave a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm, which remains the best known bound till now. In addition,
they gave a polynomial time algorithm for games where max{rank(A), rank(B)} is a constant. Later
Garg et. al. [24] improved it to min{rank(A), rank(B)} being constant. Note that, these classes are
restrictive and do not capture even all of zero-sum games. For random games, Ba´ra´ny et. al. [9]
showed that there exists a NE with support size 2 with O(1− 1/log n) probability, and using this gave an
algorithm which is efficient with high probability. A game is called win-lose game, if all the entries of
A and B are either zero or one. Chen et. al. [14] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for win-lose sparse
games, and Addario-Berry et. al. [2] gave one for win-lose planar games.
Many algorithms are designed to achieve constant factor approximation for 2-Nash [21, 10, 39]; the
best known factor till now is 0.3393 due to Tsaknakis and Spirakis [39]. Although designing a polyno-
mial time approximation scheme (PTAS) remains open, PTASs were designed for special classes, like
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [22] gave one for sparse games and games whose equilibria are guaranteed
to have small-O(1/n)-values, and Alon et. al. [6] gave a PTAS for games with rank-(log n).
2 Preliminaries
To show the hardness of rank-3 games, we start with 2D-Brouwer, reduce it to Linear-FIXP and then
to a bimatrix game. In this section we discuss each of these problems separately. First we describe a
characterization of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, and the class of 2D-Brouwer problems. Both the
problems are known to be PPAD-complete [15, 13]. Next, we describe Linear-FIXP, [23], and define a
subclass called kD-Linear-FIXP.
Notations: All the vectors are in bold-face letters, and are considered as column vectors. To denote a
row vector we use xT . The ith coordinate of the vector x is denoted by xi. 1 and 0 represent all ones
and all zeros vector respectively of appropriate dimension. We use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}.
2.1 Bimatrix games and Nash equilibrium
A bimatrix game is a two player game, each player having finitely many pure strategies (moves). Let
Si, i = 1, 2 be the set of strategies of player i, and let m
def
= |S1| and n
def
= |S2|. Then such a game can be
represented by two payoff matrices A and B, each of m×n dimension. If the first player plays strategy
i and the second plays j, then the payoff of the first player is Aij and that of the second player is Bij .
Note that the rows of these matrices correspond to the strategies of the first player and the columns to
the strategies of second player.
Players may randomize among their strategies; a randomized play is called a mixed strategy. The
set of mixed strategies for the first player is X = {x = (x1, . . . , xm) | x ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}, and for
the second player is Y = {y = (y1, . . . , yn) | y ≥ 0,
∑n
j=1 yj = 1}. By playing (x,y) ∈ X × Y we
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mean strategies are picked independently at random as per x by the first-player and as per y by the
second-player. Therefore the expected payoffs of the first-player and second-player are, respectively
∑
i,j
Aijxiyj = x
TAy and
∑
i,j
Bijxiyj = x
TBy
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium [42]) A strategy profile is said to be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile
(NESP) if no player achieves a better payoff by a unilateral deviation [34]. Formally, (x,y) ∈ X × Y
is a NESP iff ∀x′ ∈ X, xTAy ≥ x′TAy and ∀y′ ∈ Y, xTBy ≥ xTBy′.
Given strategy y for the second-player, the first-player gets (Ay)k from her k
th strategy. Clearly,
her best strategies are argmaxk(Ay)k, and a mixed strategy fetches the maximum payoff only if she
randomizes among her best strategies. Similarly, given x for the first-player, the second-player gets
(xTB)k from k
th strategy, and same conclusion applies. These can be equivalently stated as the following
complementarity type conditions,
∀i ∈ S1, xi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = maxk∈S1(Ay)k
∀j ∈ S2, yj > 0 ⇒ (x
TB)j = maxk∈S2(x
TB)k
The next lemma follows from the above discussion.
Lemma 4 Strategy profile (x,y) ∈ X × Y is a NE of game (A,B) if and only if the following holds,
where π1 and π2 are scalars capturing respective payoffs at (x,y).
∀i ∈ S1, (Ay)i ≤ π1; xi((Ay)i − π1) = 0
∀j ∈ S2, (x
TB)j ≤ π2; yj((x
TB)j − π2) = 0
Game (A,B) is said to be symmetric if B = AT . In a symmetric game the strategy sets of both
the players are identical, i.e., m = n, S1 = S2 and X = Y . We will use n, S and X to denote number
of strategies, the strategy set and the mixed strategy set respectively of the players in such a game.
A Nash equilibrium profile (x,y) ∈ X × X is called symmetric if x = y. Note that at a symmetric
strategy profile (x,x) both the players get payoff xTAx. Using Lemma 4 we get the following.
Lemma 5 Strategy profile x ∈ X is a symmetric NE of game (A,AT ), with payoff π to both players, if
and only if,
∀i ∈ S, (Ax)i ≤ π; xi((Ax)i − π) = 0
The problem of computing such a Nash equilibrium strategy in bimatrix games is PPAD-complete
[15, 20]. This also implies that computing symmetric NE of a symmetric bimatrix game is PPAD-hard,
because NE of game (A,B) are in one-to-one correspondence with the symmetric NE of game (S, ST )
with S =
[
0 A
BT 0
]
[36].
2.2 2D-Brouwer
Let Gn denote the two dimensional grid {0, . . . , 2
n−1}×{0, . . . , 2n−1}. A 3-coloring of Gn is a function
g from the vertices of Gn to {0, 1, 2}. Function g is said to be valid if for every vertex (p1, p2) on the
boundary of Gn, we have
If p2 = 0 then g(p) = 2, else if p2 > 0 & p1 = 0 then g(p) = 1, else g(p) = 0
5
Let Kp denote the unit square with p at the bottom left corner. Due to Sperner’s Lemma it is
known that for any valid coloring of g of Gn there exists a vertex p ∈ Gn such that vertices of Kp have
all the three colors - trichromatic.
2D-Brouwer Mapping Circuit: Consider a Boolean circuit Cb generating valid coloring on grid Gn.
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The circuit has 2n input bits, n bits for each of the two integers representing a grid point, and 4 output
bits ∆+1 ,∆
−
1 ,∆
+
2 ,∆
−
2 . It is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit if the following is true:
• For every p ∈ Gn, the 4 output bits of C
b satisfies one of the following 3 cases:
– Case 0: i = 1, 2, ∆−i = 1 and ∆
+
i = 0.
– Case i, i = 1, 2: ∆+i = 1 and all the other 3 bits are zero.
• For every p on the boundary of Gn, if p2 = 0 then Case 2 is satisfied, if p1 = 0 and p2 6= 0 then
Case 1 is satisfied, and for the rest Case 0 is satisfied.
Such a circuit Cb defines a valid color assignment gCb : Gn → {0, 1, 2} by setting gCb(p) = i, if the
output bits of Cb evaluated at p satisfy Case i.
Definition 6 (2D-Brouwer [13]) The input to the 2D-Brouwer consists of a valid Brouwer-mapping
circuit Cb that produces a valid coloring on Gn. The problem is to find a point p ∈ Gk such that Kp is
trichromatic.
The size of the given 2D-Brouwer problem is size[Cb], which is #input nodes + #output nodes +
# gates.
The outputs of the circuit (defining a color), can also be mapped to incremental vector (∆+1 −
∆−1 ,∆
+
2 − ∆
−
2 ). Let e
i be the incremental vector corresponding to Case (color) i, then clearly, e0 =
(−1,−1),e1 = (1, 0) and e2 = (0, 1). Define a discrete function H, such that H(p) = p + egCb(p). It
is easy to see that if Cb is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit, then H is Gn → Gn, and vertices of a
trichromatic square Kp goes in each of the e
i direction under H. Chen and Deng showed finding such
a square is PPAD-hard [13].
2.3 Linear-FIXP
Etessami and Yannakakis [23] defined the class FIXP to capture complexity of the exact fixed point
problems with algebraic solutions. An instance I of FIXP consists of an algebraic circuit CI defining a
function FI : [0, 1]
d → [0, 1]d, and the problem is to compute a fixed-point of FI . The circuit is a finite
representation of function FI (like a formula), consisting of {max,+, ∗} operations, rational constants,
and d inputs and outputs.
The circuit CI is a sequence of gates g1, . . . , gm, where for i ∈ [d], gi := λi is an input variable. For
d < i ≤ d+ r, gi := ci ∈ Q is a rational constant, with numerator and denominator encoded in binary.
For i > d + r we have gi = gj ◦ gk, where j, k < i and the binary operator ◦ ∈ {max,+, ∗}. The last d
gates are the output gates. Note that the circuit forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG), when gates are
considered as nodes, and there is an edge from gj and gk to gi if gi = gj ◦gk. Since, circuit CI represents
function FI it has to be the case that if we input λ ∈ [0, 1]
d to CI then all the gates are well defined
and the circuit outputs CI(λ) = FI(λ) in [0, 1]
d. We note that a circuit representing a problem in
FIXP operates on real numbers, but the underlying model of computation is still the standard discrete
Turing machine. In other words, an algorithm for FIXP problems is not allowed to do any computation
on reals.
5We use the definitions and terminology of [15] to remain consistent.
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Let ∗ζ denote multiplication by a rational constant ζ ∈ Q. The Linear-FIXP is a subclass of FIXP
where the operations are restricted to ◦ ∈ {max,+, ∗ζ}. A function defined by a Linear-FIXP circuit
is polynomial piecewise-linear, and all its fixed points are rational numbers of size poly(L) [23], where
L is the total size of the circuit which is #inputs + #gates + total size of the constants used in the
circuit. Etessami and Yannakakis showed that PPAD = Linear-FIXP. Next, we define a subclass of
Linear-FIXP based on the number of inputs and outputs.
Definition 7 For a k ≥ 1, an instance I is in kD-Linear-FIXP if FI : [0, 1]
k → [0, 1]k. i.e., FI is
defined by a circuit with k inputs and k outputs.
Since fixed-point of a 1-dimensional piecewise-linear function can be computed in polynomial time
using a binary search, kD-Linear-FIXP is in P for k = 1. But for any constant k > 1 it is not clear if
the problem is in P or it is hard. In the next section, we show that the problem is PPAD-hard even for
k = 2.
3 PPAD-hardness of 2D-Linear-FIXP
In this section we describe the construction of a Linear-FIXP circuit with two inputs and two outputs,
from an instance of 2D-Brouwer defined by a Boolean Brouwer-mapping circuit. We show that the func-
tion defined by the resulting 2D-Linear-FIXP circuit is such that all its fixed-points are in trichromatic
squares of the 2D-Brouwer instance, thereby proving PPAD-hardness of 2D-Liner-FIXP using [13].
Let Cb be the valid Brouwer-mapping circuit of a given 2D-Brouwer instance on grid Gn, and H
be the discrete function defined by circuit Cb. We construct a Linear-FIXP circuit C that computes a
function F : [0, 2n − 1]2 → [0, 2n − 1]2, an extension of the discrete function H.
Recall that given a bit representation of a grid point p ∈ Gn, circuit C
b outputs four bits ∆+1 ,∆
−
1 ,∆
+
2 ,∆
−
2 ,
so that for I = (∆+1 −∆
−
1 ,∆
+
2 −∆
−
2 ), H(p) = p+I. Similarly, for every non-grid point p = (p1, p2) ∈ Kq ,
we need to compute an incremental vector based on the incremental vectors of the vertices of Kq . For
this we need to extract the integer parts of p1 and p2, i.e., compute ⌊p1⌋ and ⌊p2⌋, and then its bit
representation. Since, floor is a discontinuous function, it can not be computed using Linear-FIXP
operations, which are inherently continuous. However, next we achieve this for the points not very near
to the boundary of any cell.
Recall that the operations allowed in a Linear-FIXP circuit are {max,+, ∗ζ}. Clearly, {min,−} can
be simulated using the allowed operations. Let L > 16 be a large integer with value being a power of 2,
and at most polynomial in size[Cb], i.e., L = 2l ≤ poly(size[Cb]). Consider the ExtractBits procedure
of Table 1.
ExtractBits(a)
x← a
for i=n-1 to 0 do
bi ← min{max{((x− 2
i) ∗ L2) + 1, 0}, 1}
x← x− 2ibi
endfor
Output the bit vector b = (bn−1, . . . , b0).
Table 1: Extract Bits of the Integer Part
Definition 8 We say that a ∈ R+ is poorly positioned if for some integer t ∈ Z+, a = t + ǫ, where
1 − 1
L2
< ǫ < 1. A point p ∈ R2+ is said to be poorly-positioned, if any of its coordinates is poorly
positioned, otherwise it is called well-positioned.
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Lemma 9 Given a well-positioned number a ∈ [0, 2n), the vector b = ExtractBits(a) is a bit repre-
sentation of ⌊a⌋.
Proof : Let a = a′ + ǫ, where a′ ∈ Z+ and 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 −
1
L2
. We show that every bi is either 0 or 1,
and is set correctly. Proof is by induction. If a′ ≥ 2n−1, then clearly, (a− 2n−1) ∗ L2 + 1 ≥ 1 and bn−1
will be one. If a′ < 2n−1, then (a− 2n−1) ∗ L2 + 1 ≤ (−1 + ǫ) ∗ L2 + 1 ≤ (−1 + 1− 1
L2
)L2 + 1 ≤ 0 and
hence bn−1 will be zero. In either case x = a− bn−12
n−1 will satisfy the hypothesis, and we can apply
the same argument for bit bn−2. 
Given a well positioned point p ∈ Kq , we can extract bit representations of each of the coordinates
of q due to Lemma 9, and hence of all the vertices of Kq . Next task is to obtain each of their incremental
vectors by simulating circuit Cb in Linear-FIXP. Circuit Cb is a Boolean circuit with operations ∧,∨ and
¬ and takes only Boolean input. These operations are easy to simulate in Linear-FIXP: If a, b ∈ {0, 1},
then clearly a ∧ b = min{a, b}, a ∨ b = max{a, b} and ¬a = (1− a).
Thus, if p is well positioned, then incremental vectors of the vertices of Kq can be computed using
a Linear-FIXP circuit. However, if p is poorly-positioned, then Lemma 9 provides no guarantees and
indeed the ExtractBits procedure may produce vector b with the value bis being anything in [0, 1].
This is expected due to continuity property of Linear-FIXP operations. Similar difficulty arises in the
approaches of Daskalakis et al. [20] and Chen et al. [15]. Both resort to a sampling argument, first
proposed in [20], and later improved in [15]. Next we describe a version of [15] argument.
Given a set of points S = {p1, . . . ,pl}, let Iw(S) and Ip(S) denote the set of indices of the well
and poorly positioned points of S respectively. Given p ∈ R2+, let π(p) = {q | q1, q2 are the largest
integers from {0, . . . , 2n − 1} s.t. q1 ≤ p1 and q2 ≤ p2}. For e
1 = (1, 0),e2 = (0, 1) and e0 = (−1,−1),
let ζ(p) = ei, where i = gCb(π(p)).
Lemma 10 Given p ∈ [0, 2n − 1]2, consider the set S = {p1, . . . ,p16} such that
pj = p+ (j − 1)(
1
L
,
1
L
), j ∈ [16]
For each j ∈ Ip(S), let r
j ∈ R2 be a vector with ‖rj‖∞ ≤ 1. And for each j ∈ Iw(S), let r
j = ζ(pj).
If ‖
∑16
j=1 r
j‖∞ = 0 then Kpi(p) is trichromatic.
Proof : Let Q = {qj = π(pj) | pj ∈ S}. Since 16
L
<< 1 the set crosses boundaries of cells at most
twice. In other words, for each i = 1, 2, there is at most one ji such that q
ji
i = q
ji−1
i +1. Therefore, set
Q can have at most three elements, and they are part of the same square which has to be Kpi(p).
Further, since 1
L2
<< 1
L
<< 1, there can be at most two poorly-positioned points in S. So, we
have |Iw(S)| ≥ 14. Let r
G =
∑
j∈Iw(S)
rj, then we have ‖rG +
∑
j∈Ip(S)
rj‖∞ = 0 ⇒ ‖r
G‖∞ ≤
‖
∑
j∈Ip(S)
rj‖∞ ≤ 2, because |Ip(S)| ≤ 2 and ‖r
j‖∞ ≤ 1 for each k ∈ Ip(S).
Let Wi be the number of indices of Iw(S) with r
j = ei. Using the above fact, we will show that
Wi 6= 0, i = 0, 1, 2, to prove the lemma.
If W0 = 0 then Wi ≥ 7 for either i = 1 or i = 2. In that case, r
G
i ≥ 7, a contradiction. If Wt = 0
for t = 1 or 2, then W0 < 3 or else r
G
t ≥ 3. Let i
∗ = argmax0≤i≤2Wi, then clearly Wi∗ ≥ 7 and i
∗ 6= 0.
Then, rGi∗ ≥ 7− 2 = 5, again a contradiction. 
Remark 11 Note that, in Lemma 10, it suffices to assume ‖
∑16
j=1 r
j‖∞ < 1 for p to be in a trichro-
matic square. We use this fact to derive inapproximability results in Section 5.
8
Lemma 10 implies that even if point p is poorly positioned, we can make sure that it forms a fixed-
point only when it is in a trichromatic square by sampling 16 carefully chosen points near it. Next
we describe a complete construction of the Linear-FIXP circuit C, and then show its correctness using
Lemmas 9 and 10.
S1. Let p1 and p2 denote the two inputs of the Linear-FIXP circuit. These are any real number from
[0, 2n − 1]. Compute 16 points using the + gates and rational constants:
pi = p+ (j − 1)(
1
L
,
1
L
), j ∈ [16]
S2. Call ExtractBits(p
j
t ), t = 1, 2 and j ∈ [16], and let the output vector be b
j,t.
S3. For each j ≤ [16], feed b
j,1
0 , . . . , b
j,1
n−1, b
j,2
0 , . . . b
j,2
n−1 to a simulation of circuit C
b, where ∨, ∧ and ¬x
are replaced with max, min and 1− x respectively. Note that, there are total of 16 simulations of
circuit Cb. Let ∆j+1 ,∆
j−
1 ,∆
j+
2 ,∆
j−
2 be the output values of these.
S4. For each j ∈ [16], compute r
j
1 = min{max{∆
j+
1 − ∆
j−
1 ,−1}, 1} and r
j
2 = min{max{∆
j+
2 −
∆j−2 ,−1}, 1}.
S5. Compute r1 =
1
16
∑
j∈[16] r
j
1, and r2 =
1
16
∑
j∈[16] r
j
2.
S6. Output p
′
1 = max{min{p1 + r1, 2
n − 1}, 0} and p′2 = max{min{p2 + r2, 2
n − 1}, 0}.
The number of gates used in steps S1, S4, S5 and S6 of the above procedure are constant. We used
O(n) gates in step S2, and 16 times as many as the number of gates in C
b in step S3. Further, since
value of L is polynomial in size[Cb], the constants used in steps S1, S2 and S5 are polynomial sized.
Thus, the total size of the Linear-FIXP circuit C constructed by the above procedure is polynomial
in size[Cb]. Next we show that each of the fixed-points of function F represented by circuit C are in
trichromatic squares of the grid Gn.
Lemma 12 Every fixed point of F is inside a trichromatic square of Gn.
Proof : Let p ∈ [0, 2n − 1]2 be a fixed point of F . If p ∈ (0, 2n − 1)2 then for it to be a fixed point,
the final incremental vector r has to be (0, 0). Let S = {pj | j ∈ [16]}. Due to Lemma 9, we know
that for each j ∈ Iw(S) we have r
j = ζ(pj). Further, due to step (S4) for each k ∈ Ip(S), ‖r
j‖∞ ≤ 1.
Therefore, using the fact that r = 116
∑16
j=1 r
j and Lemma 10 it follows that Kpi(p) is trichromatic.
For the remaining case, p has to be on a boundary of the grid. Since Cb is a valid circuit, vertices
on the boundary has specific incremental vectors: Let q be such a vertex then if q2 = 0 then ζ(q) =
e2 = (0, 1), else if q1 = 0 then ζ(q) = e
1 = (1, 0), otherwise ζ(q) = e0 = (−1,−1). Using this fact, and
that |Iw(S)| ≥ 14 (Lemma 10), next we show p can not be a fixed point in that case.
If p2 = 0, then for each k ∈ Iw(S), r
j = (0, 1). Therefore, we have r2 > 0 and in turn p
′
2 > p2. If
p2 > 0 and p1 = 2
n − 1, then for each k ∈ Iw(S), r
j is either (0, 1) or (−1,−1), and one of them occurs
at least 7 times. Therefore, either r2 > 0 and in turn p
′
2 > p2, or r1 < 0 and in turn p
′
1 < p1.
If 0 < p1 < 2
n−1 and p2 = 2
n−1, then for each j ∈ Iw(S), r
j is either (1, 0) or (−1,−1). Therefore,
we have either r1 > 0 and in turn p
′
1 > p1, or r2 < 0 and in turn p
′
2 < p2. If p1 = 0 and 1 ≤ p2 < 2
n− 1,
then for each j ∈ Iw(S), (r
j
1, r
j
2) = (1, 0). Therefore, we have r1 > 0 and in turn p
′
1 > p1. Further, if
p1 = 0 and 0 < p2 < 1, then by similar argument either p
′
1 > p1 or p
′
2 > p2. 
Remark 13 Note that every fixed-point of F is in a trichromatic square whose vertices with the three
colors form a right-angled triangle with north-east oriented hypotenuse.
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It is easy to shrink the range of F from [0, 2n−1] to [0, 1]. Consider a function F ′ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2,
such that F ′(λ1, λ2) =
1
2n−1F ((2
n − 1)λ1, (2
n − 1)λ2), then clearly, (λ1, λ2) is a fixed-point of F
′ if and
only if ((2n − 1)λ1, (2
n − 1)λ2)) is a fixed-point of F . Thus we get the following theorem using Lemma
12 and the fact that size[C] = poly(size[Cb]).
Theorem 14 The class of kD-Linear-FIXP with k > 1 is PPAD-hard.
Remark 15 All the known PPAD-hardness proofs for games, go through generalized circuits [20, 15],
which allows feedback-loops and approximate computation for each operation. However, in [20] and
[15] feedback-loops are used only to connect the ”output nodes” to the ”input nodes” to ensure that
their values are almost same (approximate solution). Further, each operation of generalized circuit can
be simulated using {max,+, ∗ζ}, and polynomial sized rational numbers, and most of them with exact
computation. The reduction discussed in this section can be obtained using these observations as well
from the previous approaches of reducing 2D or 3D-Brouwer to generalized circuit.
4 Reduction: kD-Linear-FIXP to Rank-(k+1) Game
Given a kD-Linear-FIXP instance, with function F : [0, 1]k → [0, 1]k represented by circuit C, in
this section we construct a rank-(k+1) bimatrix game whose Nash equilibria are almost6 in one-to-one
correspondence with the fixed points of F . We do this in two steps. First we replace the circuit C, by
a parametric linear program (LP) with k-parameters, where inputs of circuit C become parameters of
the LP. Given values of the k inputs, we show that the k outputs of the circuit C are linear function
of a solution of the LP. This defines a function F lp from Rk to Rk, and we show that the fixed points
of F lp are in one to one correspondence with the fixed-points of F . Later, we construct a rank-(k + 1)
game using the LP and its dual, whose Nash equilibria exactly captures the fixed points of F lp.
Remark 16 Recall that linear programs are equivalent to zero-sum games [19, 3]. However, the reduc-
tions from LP to zero-sum games constructs a symmetric game, and require to compute a symmetric
Nash equilibrium. There are no such restrictions in our construction, however our reduction is not gen-
eral enough and uses the fact that the parametric LP has been constructed from a Linear-FIXP circuit.
It will be interesting to reduce an LP to a non-symmetric zero-sum game, and also a fixed-point problem
with parametric LP to a constant rank game in general.
4.1 Replacing Linear-FIXP circuit with a linear program
In this section we construct a parameterized linear program with k parameters, which can replace a kD-
Linear-FIXP circuit. Let C be a kD-Linear-FIXP circuit representing the function F : [0, 1]k → [0, 1]k.
Circuit C being a Linear-FIXP circuit, it allows only three operations, namely max,+ and ∗ζ where ζ
is a rational number, and it forms a DAG. The size[C] is # inputs +# gates +# total bit lengths of
the constants in the circuit.
If C is considered as a function from Rk to Rk, then it is same as function F on [0, 1]k, but can be
anything outside this range and hence may have fixed-points outside [0, 1]k as well. To prevent this, we
add two max gates for every output of the circuit, as follows: Let τ1, . . . , τk be the k outputs of circuit
C. Without loss of generality (wlog), we will add two max gates for each l ∈ [k] to ensure that each
output value is in [0, 1]:
max{0,min{1, τl}} = max{0,−1 ∗max{−1,−1 ∗ τl}} (1)
6Essentially, Nash equilibrium strategies of the first player are in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed points
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The above transformation ensures that the output vector of C is always in [0, 1]k, and hence fixed-
points of C are exactly the fixed-points of F . Next, we show that it is wlog to assume that one of the
inputs of every max gate is zero.
Lemma 17 Given a circuit C, it can be transformed to an equivalent polynomial sized circuit where
one of the inputs of every max gate is zero.
Proof : Consider a max gate, and let a and b be the inputs and c be the output, then we have
c = max{a, b} which is equivalent to c = max{0, b− a}+ a. Therefore, we can transform circuit C such
that one input of every max gate is 0. This transformation requires 3 extra gates per max gate, two +
and one ∗ζ where ζ = −1. Clearly, the increase in the size of the circuit is polynomial. 
Wlog we assume that every max gate of circuit C has exactly one non-trivial input, and the other
input is always zero (due to Lemma 17). Let m be the number of max gates in C. Since C is a DAG,
there is an ordering among the max gates, say g1, . . . , gm, such that if there is a path from gi to gj in
C then i < j; ties are broken arbitrarily. Let n = m − 2k be the number of max gate in the original
circuit, before the addition of (1) per output. Let these be the first n max gates. Let the ordering be
such that these are the first n gates g1, . . . , gn. In (1) let gn+2l−1 denote the inner max gate and gn+2l
denote the outer one, then k outputs of circuit are the outputs of gates gn+2l, l ∈ [k].
Let the k inputs of circuit C be denoted by λ = (λ1, . . . λk), and let xi capture the output of the
ith max gate. Note that, xn+2l, l ∈ [k] are the output of the circuit. Except for the max, rest of the
two operations give rise to linear expressions in the λ and xis of the previous max gates. We use this
observation crucially in the rest of the construction.
Note that, for each i ∈ [m], the input of gi is a linear expression in x1, . . . , xi−1, λ1, . . . , λk, with a
constant term. We denote this expression by Li(x1, . . . , xi−1,λ), then the following conditions exactly
capture the operation of gi.
∀i ∈ [m], xi ≥ 0, xi ≥ Li(x1, . . . , xi−1,λ) (2)
∀i ∈ [m], xi(xi − Li(x1, . . . , xi−1,λ)) = 0 (3)
The next lemma follows by construction.
Lemma 18 Given λ ∈ Rk, (x,λ) satisfies (2) and (3) iff when λ is given as the input to circuit C,
the ith max gate evaluates to xi for all i ∈ [m].
Proof : Reverse direction follows just by construction. For the forward direction we will argue by
induction. Suppose, (x,λ) satisfies (2) and (3). Then, for λ as input to C, clearly L1 evaluates to
exactly the input of the (first max) gate g1. In that case, (2) forces that x1 is at least as large as inputs
of g1, and (3) forces that it equals one of the input. Thus, x1 captures output of g1. Now, suppose this
is true for first k ≥ 1 max gates. Then for (k + 1)th max gate, again Lk+1 is exactly the input of gk+1,
and the lemma follows by the same argument. 
Constraints of (2) gives a system of linear inequalities,
Ax ≥
k∑
l=1
λlu
l + b, x ≥ 0 (4)
where, b and ul, l ∈ [k] are m-dimensional rational vectors, and A is an m×m lower-triangular rational
matrix with ones on the diagonal. Once we plugin some values for λ1, . . . , λk, (4) becomes a polyhedron
in x. Let it be denoted by P(λ). For any λ ∈ Rk and x ∈ P(λ), vector (x,λ), satisfies (2).
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Remark 19 Enforcing (3) requires quadratic complementarity-type constraints. Using this fact, in
Section 4.3 we give a simplified proof of PPAD-harness of 2-Nash and symmetric 2-Nash (bypassing
even the parameterized LPs).
Next, we construct a cost vector c ∈ Rm, such that minimizing xT · c over P(λ) will give a solution
that, together with λ, satisfies (3) as well.
ConstructCost(A)
cm ← 1, βm ← 1
for i = m− 1 to 1 do
ci ←
∑
j>i |aji|βj + 1, βi ← ci +
∑
j>i |aji|βj
endfor;
Output c
Table 2: Construction of the Cost Vector
For c =ConstructCost(A), consider the following parameterized LP and its dual.
LP (λ) :
min : cT · x
s.t., Ax ≥
∑
l∈[k] λlu
l + b
x ≥ 0
DLP (λ) :
max : (
∑
l∈[k] λlu
l + b)T · y
s.t., ATy ≤ c
y ≥ 0
(5)
The complementary slackness requires that solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) satisfy (KKT condi-
tions),
∀i ∈ [m], yi(Ax−
∑
l∈[k]
λlu
l − b)i = 0, xi(A
Ty − c)i = 0 (6)
Lemma 20 Given λ ∈ Rk, x is a solution of LP (λ) iff (x,λ) satisfies (2) and (3).
Proof : (⇒) Let y be the dual solution corresponding to x, i.e., (x,y) satisfies (6). Since x is a feasible
point of LP (λ), clearly, (x,λ) satisfies (2). For (3), it suffices to show that ∀i ∈ [m], xi > 0 ⇒ yi > 0,
then the proof follows using (6).
Let β ∈ Rm be the vector calculated in ConstructCost(A) of Table 2. We do the proof by induction,
where we show that ∀i ∈ [m], yi ≤ βi, and xi > 0⇒ yi > 0. Recall that A is lower-triangular with ones
on the diagonal. Therefore, AT is upper-triangular with ones on the diagonal.
Our base case is when i = m: If xm > 0, then due to (6) we have ym = (A
Ty)m = cm = 1 > 0.
Further, (ATy)m ≤ cm ⇒ ym ≤ 1. Since βm = 1 we get ym ≤ βm.
Now, let the hypothesis be true for j > r. For r if xr > 0 then (A
Ty)r = cr ⇒ (A
Ty)r =
yr +
∑
j>r ajryj = cr (due to (6)). Since, ∀j > r, 0 ≤ yj ≤ βj and cr =
∑
j>r |ajr|βj + 1, we have∑
j>r ajryj < cr. Therefore, for the equality to hold we must have yr > 0. Further, (A
Ty)r =
yr +
∑
j>r ajryj ≤ cr ⇒ yr ≤ cr −
∑
j>r ajryj ≤ cr +
∑
j>r |ajr|yj ≤ cr +
∑
j>r |ajr|βj = βr.
(⇐) If (x,λ) satisfies (2) and (3) then clearly x is feasible in LP (λ). Construct y, from ym to y1
as follows: if xr = 0 then set yr = 0, else set yr = cr −
∑
j>r ajryj. It is easy to see that y is feasible in
DLP (λ), and it, together with (x,λ) satisfies (6). 
Lemmas 18 and 20 imply that LP (λ) simulates the circuit. Next, we show that the circuit can be
replaced by LP (λ) without affecting the fixed-points of F . Consider function F lp : Rk → [0, 1]k, such
that,
λ ∈ Rk, F lp(λ) = (xn+2l)l∈[k], where x = LP (λ) (7)
We show that function F lp is well-defined, and its fixed-points are exactly the fixed-points of F .
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Lemma 21 F lp is well defined, and λ ∈ Rk is a fixed-point of F lp iff it is a fixed point of F .
Proof : For any given λ ∈ Rk, using Lemmas 18 and 20, it follows that LP (λ) has a unique solution,
and if it is x then 0 ≤ xn+2l ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ [k]. Thus, F
lp is well defined.
For the second part, we know that F lp(λ) ∈ [0, 1]k. Since, λ is a fixed point, this also forces
λ ∈ [0, 1]k. Further, since circuit C represents the function F in range [0, 1]k, it suffices to show that
F lp(λ) = C(λ).
In other words, when vector λ is the input to circuit C, then ith max gate evaluates to xi, ∀i ∈ [m],
where x = LP (λ). This follows using Lemmas 18 and 20. 
Lemma 22 Size of matrix A, and vectors c, b and ul, ∀l ∈ [k] are polynomial in size[C].
Proof : By construction A, b and ul, ∀l ∈ [k], are formed by the coefficients of the linear expressions
Lis of (2). These linear expressions are constructed due to the + and ∗ζ gates of the circuit C, therefore,
the absolute value of any of its co-efficient is at most ζvmax, where v is the number of ∗ζ gates in C,
and ζmax is the maximum absolute rational constant used in C. For rational constants ζ1, ζ2, since
size(ζ1 ∗ ζ2) = size(ζ1) + size(ζ2), we have that the size of every co-efficient of Lis is at most size[C].
Thus, sizes of A, b and ul, ∀l ∈ [k] are at most polynomial in size[C]. Let Amax = maxi,j∈[m]Aij , then
by construction c1 = maxj∈[m] cj ≤ (2Amax +1)
n (see Table 2). Therefore, the size of c is also bounded
by a polynomial in size[C]. 
From Lemmas 21 and 22 we can conclude that finding a fixed point of F is equivalent to finding one
for function F lp, which can be represented using polynomially many bits in the size[C]. Next we reduce
the fixed-point computation in F lp to Nash equilibrium computation in a rank-(k+ 1) game, such that
the size of the game is polynomial in size of the parameters of function F lp.
4.2 Constructing Rank-(k+1) Game
Since, feasibility and complementary slackness are necessary and sufficient conditions for the solutions
of an LP, it is well known that an LP can be formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP).
Using this, next we construct an LCP whose solutions are exactly the fixed points of F lp. Before we
do this, note that since all the co-ordinates of the cost vector c are strictly positive, we can make it all
ones vector by dividing jth column of A by cj . Let H be the transformed matrix, i.e.,
Hij = Aij/cj
To reflect this transformation in LPs of (5) define,
LP ′(λ) :
min :
∑
i xi
s.t., Hx ≥
∑
l∈[k] λlu
l + b
x ≥ 0
DLP ′(λ) :
max : (
∑
l∈[k] λlu
l + b)T · y
s.t., HTy ≤ 1
y ≥ 0
(8)
The next lemma follows by construction.
Lemma 23 Given λ ∈ Rk, x and y are solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ) respectively iff, x′, where
x′j = xjcj , ∀j ∈ [m], and y are solutions of LP
′(λ) and DLP ′(λ) respectively.
13
For l ∈ [k], let vl be an m-dimensional vector with n + 2lth co-ordinate set to 1/cn+2l and rest
all set to zero, then vl
T
· x′ = x′n+2l/cn+2l. Lemma 23 implies that, at a fixed-point of F lp we have
λl = xn+2l = x
′
n+2l/cn+2l = vl
T
· x′, ∀l ∈ [k], where x = LP (λ) and x′ = LP ′(λ). Using this as a
motivation, we replace λl with (v
lT · x) in the constraints of LP ′(λ). The resulting matrix will be
H ′ = H −
k∑
l=1
ul · vl
T
, ∀(i, j)
Using the above observation, and feasibility and complementary slackness conditions for (8), we
construct the following LCP, called LCPC ,
H ′x ≥ b; HTy ≤ 1
x ≥ 0; y ≥ 0
∀i ∈ [m], yi(H
′x− b)i = 0; xi(H
Ty − 1)i = 0
(9)
Before we connect the solutions of LCPC with the fixed-points of F
lp, we need to establish a few
properties about H, H ′, b and uls. For this we need to understand (2) for the last 2k max gates that we
added in (1) to ensure that the outcome of the circuit is in [0, 1]k. Due to Lemma 17 we have assumed
that one of the inputs of every max gate is zero. For this to be the case, the (1) has to be transformed
as follows,
∀l ∈ [k], max{0,−1 ∗ (max{0,−τl + 1} − 1)}
Here, ∀l ∈ [k], τl is a linear expression in x1, . . . , xn,λ, and in turn so is Ln+2l−1 = 1 − τl. Recall
that xn+2l−1 captures the output of the inner max gate and xn+2l captures the output of the outer max
gate. Therefore, we have
∀l ∈ [k], xn+2l−1 ≥ 0, xn+2l−1 ≥ Ln+2l−1(x1, . . . , xn,λ)
∀l ∈ [k], xn+2l ≥ 0, xn+2l ≥ 1− xn+2l−1 ⇒ xn+2l−1 + xn+2l ≥ 1
(10)
The following properties are easy to obtain using (10).
P1. ∀l ∈ [k], (Ax)n+2l = xn+2l−1 + xn+2l, bn+2l = 1, and u
l′
n+2l = 0, ∀l
′ ∈ [k].
P2. ∀l ∈ [k], note that xn+2l appears only in one constraint. Thus n+2l
th column of A is a unit vector
with n+ 2lth co-ordinate set to one, and hence (ATy)n+2l = yn+2l, ∀l ∈ [k].
P3. From (P2) and the ConstructCost procedure it follows that cn+2l = 1, ∀l ∈ [k]. Therefore, the
non-zero co-ordinate of vl, namely 1/cn+2l, is 1, for all l ∈ [k].
P4. SinceHij = Aij/cj, we get that ∀l ∈ [k], (H
Ty)n+2l = yn+2l (using (P2) and (P3)), and (H
′x)n+2l ≥
bn+2l ≡ xn+2l−1/cn+2l−1 + xn+2l ≥ 1 (using (P1) and (P3)).
The above properties are crucial to the over all reduction.
Lemma 24 Vector (x′,y′) is a solution of LCPC of (9) if and only if λ ∈ [0, 1]
k, where λl = x
′
n+2l, ∀l ∈
[k], is a fixed-point of F lp.
Proof : (⇒) Let (x′,y′) be a solution of LCPC . Then by construction of LCPC , clearly x
′ and y′
are solutions of LP ′(λ) and DLP ′(λ) respectively, where λl = v
lTx′ = x′n+2l, ∀l ∈ [k] (using P3). Set
y = y′, and x be such that xj = x
′
j/cj, then using Lemma 23 we get that, x and y are solutions of LP (λ)
and DLP (λ). Further, property P3 ensures that xn+2l = x
′
n+2l = λl,∀l ∈ [k]. Thus, λ is a fixed-point
of F lp.
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(⇐) Let λ be a fixed-point of F lp and let x and y be the solutions of LP (λ) and DLP (λ). Let
y′ = y and x′j = cjxj ,∀j ∈ [m], then using Lemma 23 we get that x
′ and y′ are solutions of LP ′(λ)
and DLP ′(λ) respectively. Using the fact that λ is a fixed-point of F lp and property P3, we get
vl
T
·x′ = x′n+2l = xn+2l = λl, ∀l ∈ [k]. In that case, feasibility and complementary slackness of LP
′(λ)
and DLP ′(λ), ensures that (x′,y′) is a solution of LCPC . 
Next, we capture solutions of LCPC as Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game. Consider the following
game:
A˜ =
[
HT 0
0T 1
]
, B˜ =
[
−H ′T 0
bT + 1T 1
]
(11)
where 1 and 0 are m-dimensional vectors of 1s and 0s respectively. Number of strategies of both the
players is m+ 1. Let (x˜, s) and (y˜, t) denote mixed-strategy vectors of the first player and the second
player, then we have,
(x˜, s) ≥ 0; (y˜, t) ≥ 0; s+
m∑
i=1
x˜i = 1; t+
m∑
j=1
y˜j = 1 (12)
Remark 25 Adler and Verma [4], used this idea of adding an extra column/row to handle the r.h.s.,
in their reduction from ‘solving’ some special LCPs to symmetric game.
The property that matrix of LCPC is semi-monotone, shown in the next lemma, is important to
derive equivalence between the NE of (A˜, B˜) and the solutions of LCPC .
Lemma 26 Let M =
[
0 HT
−H ′ 0
]
be the matrix of LCPC . For any q ∈ R
2m with q > 0, the only
solution of LCP {Mz ≤ q; z ≥ 0; zT (Mz − q) = 0} is z = 0.
Proof : It suffices to show that for any z ≥ 0,z 6= 0, there is a d ∈ [2m] such that zd > 0 and
(Mz)d ≤ 0. Partition z as (x,y). If ∀l ∈ [k], zn+2l = xn+2l = 0, then H
′x = Hx. Therefore,
zTMz = xTHTy − yTHx = 0. For all d ∈ [m], if we have, zd > 0 ⇒ (Mz)d > 0 then z
TMz > 0, a
contradiction.
On the other hand, ∃l ∈ [k] with zn+2l > 0 and (Mz)n+2l ≤ 0 then done. Otherwise, we have
zn+2l > 0 and (Mz)n+2l > 0. This gives (Mz)n+2l = yn+2l = zm+n+2l > 0 and
(Mz)m+n+2l = −(H
′x)n+2l = −xn+2l−1/cn+2l−1 − xn+2l = xn+2l−1/cn+2l−1 − zn+2l < 0 (Using (P4)). 
If ((x˜, s), (y˜, t)) is a Nash equilibrium of game (A˜, B˜), the following have to be satisfied (see Lemma
4 for the NE characterization), where π1 and π2 are the scalars capturing payoffs of the first and the
second player respectively.
t ≤ π1; s(t− π1) = 0
s ≤ π2; t(s− π2) = 0
∀i ∈ [m], (HT y˜)i ≤ π1; x˜i((H
T y˜)i − π1) = 0
∀j ∈ [m], (−x˜TH ′)j + bjs+ s ≤ π2; y˜j((−x˜
TH ′)j + bjs+ s− π2) = 0
(13)
Lemma 27 If ((x˜, s), (y˜, t)) is a Nash equilibrium of game (A˜, B˜) with s > 0 and t > 0, then ( x˜
s
,
y˜
t
) is
a solution of LCPC . Further, if (x,y) is a solution of LCPC then (
(x,1)
1+
∑
i xi
,
(y,1)
1+
∑
i yi
) is a NE of game
(A˜, B˜).
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Proof : Since, s > 0 and t > 0, we have π1 = t and π2 = s respectively (using (13)). Replacing π1
and π2 accordingly in the inequalities of (13), we get
∀i ∈ [m], (HT y˜)i ≤ t; x˜i((H
T y˜)i − t) = 0
∀j ∈ [m], (H ′x˜)j ≥ bjs; y˜j((H
′x˜)j − bjs) = 0
Dividing the first expression of first line by t and of second line by s, and the second expression in both
lines by s ∗ t, we get constraints of LCPC .Thus (
x˜
s
,
y˜
t
) is a solution of the LCP. The second part is easy
to verify using the formulation of LCPC (9) and NE conditions (12) and (13). 
Lemma 27 shows that NE of game (A˜, B˜) with s > 0, t > 0 exactly capture the solutions of LCPC .
Next lemma shows that these are the only NE of this game.
Lemma 28 If ((x˜, s), (y˜, t)) is a Nash equilibrium of game (A˜, B˜) then s > 0 and t > 0.
Proof : We will derive a contradiction for each of the three cases separately.
Case 1: s > 0 and t = 0
Then, we have π1 = t = 0 and therefore, H
T y˜ ≤ 0. Since HT is upper-triangular with strictly positive
values on the diagonal, the only solution of HT y˜ ≤ 0 is y˜ = 0, which contradicts the fact that co-
ordinates of vector (y˜, t) sums to one (see (12)).
Case 2: s = 0 and t > 0
Then, we have π2 = s = 0 and therefore, −H
′x˜ ≤ 0. Recall that H ′ = H −
∑k
l=1 u
l · vl
T
and
vl
T
· x˜ = x˜n+2l. Further, due to property (P4), ∀l ∈ [k], (H
′x˜)n+2l = x˜n+2l−1/cn+2l−1 + x˜n+2l. And, due
to (P2) we have (H
T y˜)n+2l = y˜n+2l.
Now, for an l ∈ [k] if x˜2+nl > 0, then (H
T y˜)n+2l = π1 ⇒ y˜n+2l = π1 > 0 (using (13) and
t > 0). However, the n+2lth strategy of the second player is not fetching the maximum payoff, because
(−H ′x˜)n+2l ≤ −x˜n+2l < 0, a contradiction.
Thus, we have x˜2+nl = 0,∀l ∈ [k]. Then H
′x˜ = Hx˜. Further, the best response condition of the
first player gives (x˜, s)T A˜(y˜, t) = π1 ⇒ x˜
THT y˜ = π1 > 0, and the best response condition of the second
player gives (x˜, s)T B˜(y˜, t) = π2 ⇒ x˜
THT y˜ = 0 a contradiction.
Case 3: s = 0 and t = 0
If π1 > 0 and π2 > 0, then due to conditions (12) and (13), vector z˜ = (x˜, y˜) 6= 0 is a solution of
LCP Mz ≤ q,z ≥ 0,zT (Mz − q) = 0, where M =
[
0 HT
−H ′ 0
]
and q = (π1 ∗ 1, π2 ∗ 1) > 0. This
contradicts Lemma 26.
If π1 = 0, then the argument is similar to Case 1. If π1 > 0 and π2 = 0, then it is similar to Case
2. 
Now, we have established all the required facts to obtain the main theorems. Using Lemmas 28, 27,
24, 21, and 22, we show the next theorem.
Theorem 29 Given a kD-Linear-FIXP function F defined by circuit C, there exists a bimatrix game
(A˜, B˜) with rank(A˜+ B˜) ≤ (k + 1), and A˜ upper-triangular, such that the Nash equilibrium strategies
of the first player in game (A˜, B˜) are in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed-points of function F ,
where size[A˜] + size[B˜] ≤ poly(size[C]).
Proof : From circuit C of F construct F lp of (7), then LCPC of (9) from F
lp, and finally game
(A˜, B˜) of (11) from the LCP. Using Lemmas 21 and 24 it follows that solution vectors x of LCPC are
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in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed point of F lp, which are exactly the fixed points of function
F in Linear-FIXP that we started with.
Further, the Nash equilibrium (x˜, s), (y˜, t)) of game (A˜, B˜) maps to a solution ( x˜
s
,
y˜
t
) of LCPC (due
to Lemmas 27 and 28). And, two NE with distinct first players strategies (x˜, s) 6= (x˜′, s′) can not
map to the same x in a solution of LCPC . If they do, then we have
x˜
s
= x˜
′
s′
⇒ s′
∑
i x˜i = s
∑
i x˜
′
i ⇒
s′(1− s) = s(1− s′)⇒ s′ = s⇒ x˜ = x˜′, a contradiction.
Thus we get a game (A˜, B˜) whose Nash equilibrium strategies of the first player are in one-to-one
correspondence with the fixed points of F . Since H ′ = H −
∑k
l=1 u
lvl
T
, rank(A˜ + B˜) ≤ k + 1, and
since H is upper-triangular, A˜ is also upper-triangular. The size of matrices A˜ and B˜ is bounded by
polynomial in size of A, b, c and ul, ∀l ∈ [k], and hence the theorem follows using Lemma 22. 
Using Theorems 14 and 29, we get the next theorem.
Theorem 30 Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with rank-k, k > 2 is PPAD-hard.
Since, matrix A˜ is upper-triangular, we get the following corollary,
Corollary 31 Nash equilibrium computation in constant rank bimatrix games with one of the matrix
being lower/upper-triangular is PPAD-hard.
NE computation in a bimatrix game (A,B) can be reduced to computing a symmetric NE of a
symmetric bimatrix game (S, ST ) where S =
[
0 A
BT 0
]
[36]. Note that if, rank(A + B) is k then
rank(S + ST ) is 2k, and therefore using Theorem 30 we get,
Corollary 32 Computing a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a symmetric game with rank-k, k > 5, is
PPAD-hard.
Etessami and Yannakakis [23] showed that solving a simple stochastic games reduces to computing a
unique fixed-point of a Linear-FIXP problem. Note that if the Linear-FIXP instance that we start with
has a unique fixed-point then the resulting game in Theorem 29 will have a unique Nash equilibrium
strategy of the first player. In that case, the NE strategies of the second player should form a convex
set because they are essentially solutions of a feasibility lp (follows Lemma 4). Using this together with
the result of [23], we get the following.
Corollary 33 Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with a convex set of Nash equilibria is
as hard as solving a simple stochastic game.
Chen et. al. [15] showed PPAD-hardness for NE computation in bimatrix games (2-Nash), which
also implies that symmetric NE computation in symmetric bimatrix game is PPAD-hard (symmetric
2-Nash) as the former reduces to the latter (discussed in Section 2). Theorem 30 gives an alternative
proof of these facts. The Chen et. al. reduction goes through generalized circuit (similar to Linear-FIXP
circuit) with fuzzy gates, graphical games, and game gadgets to simulate each gate of the generalized
circuit separately. Our reduction bypasses all of these completely, and provides a simpler reduction using
the connections between LPs, LCPs and bimatrix games. In the next section we give further simplified
proof for PPAD-hardness of 2-Nash and symmetric 2-Nash, bypassing even the parameterized LP.
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4.3 Hardness of symmetric and non-symmetric 2-Nash
Lemma 18 shows that (2) and (3) are enough to capture execution of the circuit in x for given λ.
As discussed in Section 4.1 for any λ ∈ Rk and x ∈ P(λ) (the polyhedron defined in (4)), vector
(x,λ), satisfies (2). However, enforcing (3) requires quadratic complementarity-type constraints. Using
these facts, in this section we directly construct an LCP and then a symmetric bimatrix game (without
going through the parameterized LP). This will give a further simplified proofs for PPAD-hardness
of symmetric 2-Nash, and also for 2-Nash using the reduction from the former to the later through
imitation games [31].
Consider the A, b and ul,∀l ∈ [k] of (4). Recall that A, b and ul satisfies properties (P1) and (P2)
described in Section 4.2. Further, since evaluating circuit C is equivalent to satisfying (2) and (3), where
xi captures the output of i
th max gate, xn+2l, ∀l ∈ [k] captures the outputs of the circuit (Lemma 18).
Let vl ∈ Rm be a unit vector with 1 on (n + 2l)th co-ordinate and zeros otherwise, i.e., vl
T
x = xn+2l.
Let A′ = A−
∑
l∈[k]u
lvl
T
, and consider the following LCP.
x ≥ 0; A′x ≥ b
∀i ∈ [m], xi((A
′x)i − bi) = 0
(14)
Lemma 34 Vector x ∈ Rm is a solution of LCP 14 iff λ, where λl = xn+2l,∀l ∈ [k], is a fixed-point of
the Linear-FIXP function F .
Proof : Since, ∀l ∈ [k], λl = xn+2l = v
lTx the forward direction follows, because (x,λ) satisfies both
(2) and (3) by construction (Lemma 18). For the reverse direction let λ be a fixed-point of F and x be a
vector such that xi is the output value of i
th max gate when λ is the input to the circuit C. Clearly (x,λ)
satisfies (2) and (3) (Lemma 18). The lemma follows using the fact that λl = xn+2l = v
lTx,∀l ∈ [k]
because λ is a fixed point. 
Next, we construct a symmetric bimatrix game whose symmetric NE are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the solutions of LCP (14). Let S be the following (m+ 1)× (m+ 1)-dimensional matrix.
S =
[
−A′ b+ 1
0T 1
]
Consider the symmetric game (S, ST ). Using Lemma 5 we get that a mixed strategy vector z =
(x, t) ∈ R(m+1) is a symmetric NE of game (S, ST ) if and only if
x ≥ 0; t ≥ 0; t+
∑
i∈[m] xi = 1
−A′x+ bt+ t ≤ π; t ≤ π;
∀i ∈ [m], xi((−A
′x)i + bit+ t− π) = 0; t(t− π) = 0
(15)
where π is the payoff zTSz of both the agents at NE (z,z).
Lemma 35 Strategy z = (x, t), with t > 0, is a symmetric NE of game (S, ST ) iff x′ = x
t
is a solution
of LCP (14). Further, if x is a solution of LCP (14) then (x,1)1+
∑
i xi
is a symmetric NE of game (S, ST ).
Proof : If t > 0 then the third condition of (15) ensures that π = t. In that case, the second
inequality becomes A′x
t
≥ b, and the third equality becomes xi
t
(A′x − b)i = 0, ∀i ∈ [m], which are
exactly the conditions of LCP (14). Therefore, x′ = x˜
t
is a solution of the LCP (14).
Further, if x′ is a solution of the LCP, then for t = 11+
∑
i x
′
i
, xi = tx
′
i and π = t, ((x, t), π) satisfies
all the conditions of (15), and hence the lemma follows. The second part follows using the conditions
of LCP formulation (14) and symmetric NE (15). 
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Lemma 35 shows that symmetric NE of game (S, ST ) with t > 0 are in one-to-one correspondence
with the solutions of LCP (14). One-to-one because clearly no two symmetric NE of game (S, ST ) maps
to the same solution of LCP (14). Next, we show that these are the only Symmetric NE of this game.
Lemma 36 If z = (x, t) is a symmetric NE of game (S, ST ) then t > 0.
Proof : To the contrary suppose t = 0, then π ≥ t = 0 and −A′x ≤ π. Recall that (−A′x)n+2l =
−xn+2l−1 − xn+2l, ∀l ∈ [k] using (P1). Now, if xn+2l > 0 then −(A
′x)n+2l < 0 which contradicts
the third condition of (15). Therefore, we have ∀l ∈ [k], xn+2l = 0 implying that A
′x = Ax because
vl
T
x = xn+2l = 0, ∀l ∈ [k]. Let i
∗ be the first strategy played with the non-zero probability, i.e.,
i∗ = argminxi>0,i∈[m]i. The payoff from i
∗ should be maximum and hence (−A′x)i∗ = π. Since, A is
lower-triangular we have π = (−A′x)i∗ = (−Ax)i∗ = xi∗ < 0, a contradicting 0 = t ≤ π. 
The next theorem follows using Theorem 14 and Lemmas 22, 34, 35 and 36.
Theorem 37 The problem of computing a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a symmetric bimatrix game
is PPAD-hard.
As discussed in Section 4.2, [23] showed that solving simple stochastic games [16] reduces to finding
a unique fixed-point of a Linear-FIXP problem. Using this together with Theorem 37 we get the next
corollary.
Corollary 38 Computing a unique symmetric NE of a symmetric game is as hard as solving a simple
stochastic game.
McLannen and Tourky [31] showed that the symmetric Nash equilibria of a symmetric game (S, ST )
are in one-to-one correspondence with the Nash equilibrium strategies of the second player of game
(S, I), where I is an identity matrix. Thus the next theorem follows using Theorem 37.
Theorem 39 The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is PPAD-hard.
5 Linear-FIXP: Hardness of Approximation
Chen et. al. [15] showed that higher dimensional discrete fixed-point problem (defined below) is PPAD-
hard even when the grid has a constant length in each dimension. Using this result, in this section we
show inapproximability results for Linear-FIXP, by reducing a discrete fixed point problems to finding
an approximate solution of a Linear-FIXP problem; the reduction is similar to that of Section 3. An
approximate fixed point can be defined as follows:
Definition 40 Vector x ∈ [0, 1]k is an ǫ-approximate fixed point of function F : [0, 1]k → [0, 1]k if
‖x− F (x)‖∞ ≤ ǫ.
Similar to 2D-Brouwer, let kD-Brouwer represent the class of k-dimensional discrete fixed-point
problems. An instance of kD-Brouwer consists of a grid Gkn = {0, . . . , 2
n − 1}k, and a valid coloring
function g : Gkn → {0, 1, . . . , k}, which satisfies the following: Let ∂(G
k
n) denote the set of points p ∈ G
k
n
with pi ∈ {0, 2
n − 1} for some i, i.e., boundary points, then,
For p ∈ ∂(Gkn), if pi > 0,∀i ∈ [k] then g(p) = 0, otherwise g(p) = max{i | pi = 0, i ∈ [k]}
LetKp = {q | qi ∈ {pi, pi+1}} be the set of vertices of a unit hyper-cube with p at the lowest-corner.
As discussed in [15], given any valid coloring g of Gkn, ∃p ∈ G
k
n such that the vertices of hyper-cube
Kp have all k + 1 colors; Kp is called a panchromatic cube. However, since there are 2
k vertices in a
hyper-cube, given p there is no efficient way to check if Kp is panchromatic. Therefore, Chen et. al.
introduces the following notion of discrete fixed points.
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Definition 41 (Panchromatic Simplex [15]) A subset P ⊂ Gkn is accommodated if P ⊂ Kp for
some point p ∈ Gkn. It is a panchromatic simplex of a color assignment g if it is accommodated and
contains exactly k + 1 points with k + 1 distinct colors.
From the above discussion it follows that for any valid coloring g on Gkn, there exists a panchromatic
simplex in Gkn [15]. Similar to 2D-Brouwer the coloring function g is specified by a kD-Brouwer mapping
circuit Cb.
kD-Brouwer Mapping Circuit: The circuit has kn input bits, n bits for each of the k integers
representing a grid point, and 2k output bits ∆+i ,∆
−
i , ∀i ∈ [k]. It is a valid Brouwer-mapping circuit if
the following is true:
• For every p ∈ Gn, the 2k output bits of C
b satisfies one of the following k + 1 cases:
– Case 0: ∀i ∈ [k], ∆−i = 1 and ∆
+
i = 0.
– Case i, i ∈ [k]: ∆+i = 1 and all the other 2k − 1 bits are zero.
• For every p ∈ ∂Gkn, if ∃i ∈ [k] with pi = 0 then letting imax = max{i | pi = 0}, the output bits
satisfy Case imax, otherwise they satisfy Case 0.
Such a circuit Cb defines a valid color assignment gCb : G
k
n → {0, 1, . . . , k} by setting gCb(p) = i,
if the output bits of Cb evaluated at p satisfy Case i. Let ei be a k-dimensional unit vector with 1 on
ith coordinate, and e0 be a vector with all k coordinates set to −1. Then, a k-dimensional vector I
set to Ii = ∆
+
i − ∆
−
i , ∀i ∈ [k] is e
i for Case i. This defines a discrete function H : Gkn → G
k
n where
H(p) = p+ egCb(p).
Given a kD-Brouwer mapping circuit Cb on grid Gkn, next we construct a kD-Linear-FIXP circuit
C defining a function F : [0, 2n−1]k → [0, 2n−1]k, which is an extension of function H. We show that
all the 1
poly(L) -approximate fixed-points of F are in panchromatic cubes of G
k
n, where L is the size of
circuit Cb. Further, we give a polynomial time procedure to compute a panchromatic simplex from an
approximate fixed-point. When we reduce the range from [0, 2n − 1]k to [0, 1]k, to bring the function
in to a standard form of Linear-FIXP, the approximation factor becomes 12npoly(L) .
Recall that circuit C has k real inputs and outputs, {max,+, ∗ζ} operations, and rational constants.
The construction is almost same as that in Section 3. Let L > k4 be a large integer with value being a
power of 2, and at most polynomial in size[Cb], i.e., L = 2l ≤ poly(size[Cb]). As in Definition 8 well-
positioned and poorly-positioned points of Rk+ may be defined. Further, for p ∈ [0, 2
n)k, let π(p) = ⌊p⌋
and ζ(p) = egCb (pi(p)).
For a well-positioned point p ∈ [0, 2n) the bit representation of each coordinate of π(p) can be
computed in C using ExtractBits procedure of Table 1 (due to Lemma 9). This bit representation,
when fed to a simulation of Cb where ∧, ∨ and ∧ are replaced by min, max and (1 − x) respectively,
outputs 2k values which is exactly Cb(π(p)). However, it is still not clear how to efficiently check if
hyper-cube Kq is panchromatic because it has 2
k vertices. Further, if p is poorly-positioned to start
with, then it is not clear how to compute even the bit representation of π(p) using operations of Linear-
FIXP. To circumvent these issues we use a geometric lemma proved by Chen et. al. [15], described
next. For a finite set S ⊂ Rk+, let Iw(S) contain the indices of the well-positioned points of S and Ip(S)
contain indices of poorly-positioned points.
Lemma 42 [15] Given p ∈ [0, 2n − 1]k, consider the set S = {p1, . . . ,pk
4
} such that
pj = p+
(j − 1)
L
∑
i∈[k]
ei, j ∈ [k4]
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For each j ∈ Ip(S), let r
j ∈ Rk be a vector with ‖rj‖∞ ≤ 1. And for each j ∈ Iw(S), let r
j = ζ(pk).
If ‖
∑n4
j=1 r
j‖∞ < 1 then Qw = {π(p
j) | j ∈ Iw(S)} is panchromatic simplex.
Proof : Let Q = {qj = π(pj) | pj ∈ S}. Since k
4
L
<< 1 the set crosses boundaries of the unit cells
at most k times. In other words, for each i ∈ [k], there is at most one ji such that q
ji
i = q
ji−1
i + 1.
Therefore, set Q can have at most k+1 elements, and they are part of the same unit hyper-cube, which
has to be Kpi(p). Clearly, Qw ⊂ Q.
Further, since 1
L2
<< 1
L
<< 1, there can be at most k poorly-positioned points in S. So, we
have |Iw(S)| ≥ k
4 − k. Let rG =
∑
j∈Iw(S)
rj , then we have ‖rG +
∑
j∈Ip(S)
rj‖∞ < 1 ⇒ ‖r
G‖∞ <
1 + ‖
∑
j∈Ip(S)
rj‖∞ < k + 1, because |Ip(S)| ≤ k, and ‖r
j‖∞ ≤ 1 for each j ∈ Ip(S).
Let ∀i ∈ [k], Wi be the number of indices of Iw(S) with r
k = ei. Using the above fact, we will show
that Wi 6= 0,∀i, to prove the lemma.
If W0 = 0 then Wi > k
2 for some i ∈ [k]. In that case, rGi ≥ k
2, a contradiction. If Wt = 0 for a
t ∈ [k], then W0 < k + 1 or else r
G
t ≥ k + 1. Let i
∗ = argmax0≤i≤kWi, then clearly, Wi∗ ≥ k
3 − 1 and
i∗ 6= 0. Then, rGi∗ ≥ k
3 − 1− k, again a contradiction. 
Using Lemma 42 we can construct circuit C as done in steps (S1) to (S6) in Section 3, where
instead of 16, k4 points have to be sampled, and finally in step (S6) the incremental vector
∑
j r
j has
to be divided by k4 in order to take an average. This circuit will define a piecewise-linear function
F : [0, 2n − 1]k → [0, 2n − 1]k. Next, we show that it suffices to compute a 1
L
-approximate fixed point
of F in order to find a panchromatic simplex.
Lemma 43 Every 1
L
-approximate fixed point of F is in a panchromatic hyper-cube of Gn,k.
Proof : Let p be a 1
L
-approximate fixed point of F , and p′ = F (p). Then, the set S of sampled
points is S = {pj = p+ (j−1)
L
∑
i∈[k] e
i | j ∈ [k4]}, and rj is the outcome vector in step (S4) for p
j. By
construction, we have rj = ζ(pj),∀j ∈ Iw(S), and ‖r
j‖∞ ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ [k
4]. Further, r is the average of
rjs, and hence ‖r‖∞ ≤ 1.
Suppose, p is not inside a panchromatic hyper-cube, then ‖r‖∞ ≥
1
k4
> 1
L
by Lemma 42. If p is at
least 1
L
distance away from the boundary of [0, 2n− 1]k, i.e., 1
L
≤ pi ≤ 2
n− 1− 1
L
, ∀i ∈ [k], then clearly
‖p− F (p)‖ ≥ 1
L
, a contradiction.
For the points near boundary it may happen that ‖r‖∞ ≥
1
k4
, but still due to rounding in step (S6),
they generate dummy fixed-points. Using the fact that Cb generates a valid coloring, we show that this
can never happen. Let p be such that for some i either pi <
1
L
or pi > 2
n − 1− 1
L
.
• ∃i ∈ [k], pi <
1
L
: Let imax = max{i | pi <
1
L
}, then ∀j ∈ [k4]pjimax < 1. Therefore, ∃i
′ ≥ imax such
that pi < 1 and ri′ > 0, implying that p
′
i > pi.
• ∀i ∈ [k], pi > 1: Since ∃i
′ with pi′ > 2
n−1− 1
L
, except for p1 all other pj are outside of [0, 2n−1]k,
and π(pj) > 0. Therefore, ∀j ∈ Iw(S), j 6= 1, we have r
j = e0 < 0. Hence ∃i, such that p′i < pi.
• ∃i, i′ ∈ [k], pi < 1 and pi′ > 2
n − 1 − 1
L
: Let imax = max{i |pi < 1}, then ∃i
′′ ≤ imax such that
either pi′′ < 1 and ri′′ > 0 implying that p
′
i′′ > pi, or ri′ < 0 implying that p
′
i′ < pi′ .

If p is a 1
L
-approximate fixed point of F , then it is in panchromatic hyper-cube of Gn,k (Lemma 43),
and the panchromatic simplex containing p is {π(pj) | pj = p+ (j−1)
L
∑
i∈[k] e
i} (Lemma 42). Therefore
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given a 1
L
-approximate fixed point of F a panchromatic simplex of Gkn can be computed in polynomial
time.
We can shrink the range of function F from [0, 2n − 1] to [0, 1]k by multiplying and dividing the
inputs and outputs respectively by 2n− 1. For the modified function, 12nL -approximate fixed-points are
guaranteed to be in panchromatic hyper-cubes. Note that, Lemmas 42 and 43 holds for any L strictly
greater than k4, hence 12nL =
1
2npoly(k) . Further, by construction size[C] = (#inputs + # gates + total
size of the constant used in C), is polynomial in size[Cb]
Therefore, a kD-Brouwer problem of computing a panchromatic simplex reduces to finding a 1
γpoly(k) -
approximate fixed-point of a kD-Linear-FIXP function, where γ is the largest absolute constant used in
the circuit. Chen et. al. [15] proved that kD-Brouwer with n = 3 and k not a constant is PPAD-hard
(Brouwerf1 in [15]). Since, the largest absolute constant used in the kD-Linear-FIXP circuit constructed
from such an instance is of O(1), the next theorem follows,
Theorem 44 Let F be a piecewise-linear function defined by a Linear-FIXP circuit C, and let L =
size[C]. Then Computing a 1
poly(L)-approximate fixed-point of F is PPAD-hard.
Remark 45 We note that Theorem 44 may also follow from the 2-Nash to Linear-FIXP reduction
shown by Etessami and Yannakakis [23].
6 Discussion
In this paper we show that Nash equilibrium computation in bimatrix games with rank≥ 3 is PPAD-
hard by reducing 2D-Brouwer to rank-3 games. Given an instance of 2D-Brouwer first we reduce it to
2D-Linear-FIXP, a 2-dimensional fixed-point problem defined by a Linear-FIXP circuit with two inputs.
Next we replace the circuit by a parameterized linear program with two parameters, and finally using the
connections between LPs and LCPs, and LCPs and bimatrix games, we construct a rank-3 game. This,
last step of the reduction uses the fact that the parameterized linear program was constructed from a
Linear-FIXP circuit. It will be interesting to reduce a fixed-point problem, defined by a parameterized
LP, to a bimatrix game in general. This will extend the classical construction of zero-sum games from
linear programs by Dantzig [19]. If fixed-point problem with k-parameter LP can be reduced to a rank-k
game, then it will imply that rank-2 games are also PPAD-hard, settling the only unresolved case.
As corollaries of our reduction, we get that 2D-Linear-FIXP = PPAD = Linear-FIXP, and in turn
a sharp dichotomy on complexity of Linear-FIXP problems; 1D-Linear-FIXP is in P, while for k ≥ 2,
kD-Linear-FIXP is PPAD-complete. We also give an explicit construction of a rank-(k+ 1) game from
a kD-Linear-FIXP problem. This construction (almost) preserves the number of solutions (in terms
of NE strategies of the first player), and is different from all the previous approaches. This should be
of useful to understand the connections between problems that reduces to Linear-FIXP, and bimatrix
games. One such example is Corollary 33 which shows that even if Nash equilibrium set of a bimatrix
game is guaranteed to be convex, finding one is as hard as solving a simple stochastic game.
In Section 5 we show hardness of approximation for Linear-FIXP problems. It is not immediately
clear how to extend this to bimatrix games through our reduction. If done, it will provide an alternate
(simpler) proof of inapproximability in 2-Nash [15].
For the case of symmetric games, the PPAD-hardness of rank-3 games imply that computing a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric rank-6 games is PPAD-hard. The polynomial time algorithm
for computing symmetric NE of a rank-1 symmetric games by Mehta et. al. [32] leaves the status of
symmetric games with rank-2 to rank-5 unresolved.
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